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Abstract 
Vehicular Networks (VANET) are the largest real-life paradigm of ad hoc networks 
which aim to ensure road safety and enhance drivers’ comfort. In VANET, the ve-
hicles communicate or collaborate with each other and with adjacent infrastructure 
by exchanging significant messages, such as road accident warnings, steep-curve 
ahead warnings or traffic jam warnings. However, this communication and other as-
sets involved are subject to major threats and provide numerous opportunities for 
attackers to launch several attacks and compromise security and privacy of vehicular 
users. This paper reviews the cyber security in VANET and proposes an asset-based 
approach for VANET security. Firstly, it identifies relevant assets in VANET. Se-
condly, it provides a detailed taxonomy of vulnerabilities and threats on these assets, 
and, lastly, it classifies the possible attacks in VANET and critically evaluates them. 
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1. Introduction 
1.1. Background 
With large number of vehicles distributed around the world, traffic efficiency and driv-
er safety have become relevant challenges of the modern age. According to the World 
Health Organization, approximately 1.25 million people die every year due to traffic ac-
cidents [1]. Traffic accidents are also responsible for creating massive road congestion 
which results in huge delays. The main goal of Vehicular Networks (VANET) is to 
solve part of these problems. In fact, VANET is the largest real life application of Mo-
bile Ad Hoc Networks (MANET) where the nodes are replaced by moving vehicles with 
How to cite this paper: Ahmad, F., Ad-
nane, A. and N. L. Franqueira, V. (2016) A 
Systematic Approach for Cyber Security in 
Vehicular Networks. Journal of Computer 
and Communications, 4, 38-62. 
http://dx.doi.org/10.4236/jcc.2016.416004  
 
Received: November 21, 2016 
Accepted: December 26, 2016 
Published: December 30, 2016 
 
Copyright © 2016 by authors and  
Scientific Research Publishing Inc. 
This work is licensed under the Creative 
Commons Attribution International  
License (CC BY 4.0). 
http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/ 
   Open Access
F. Ahmad et al. 
 
39 
sensing and communication capabilities [2] [3] [4].  
VANET is a novel cutting-edge technology and is the future of Intelligent Transpor-
tation System (ITS). ITS will become more and more prevalent in the near future and it 
is expected that millions of vehicles will be connected through VANET by 2022 [5]. 
VANET plays a significant role in the success of emerging smart cities and Internet of 
Things (IoT) [6]. 
In VANET, the vehicles are equipped with various sensing and communication de-
vices (e.g. camera, GPS). The sensors collect significant information from the vehicle, 
such as its location, speed and acceleration, and share it with other neighbouring vehi-
cles and adjacent roadside units (RSU) through wireless interfaces (e.g., Long Term 
Evolution (LTE), Dedicated Short Range Communication (DSRC)) [7] [8]. RSU is a 
static entity, such as speed camera, mobile communication base station or relay nodes 
[9], positioned along the roadside; in the context of VANET, such units are considered 
as infrastructure. The messages generated are exchanged through two modes of com-
munication, i.e., 1) vehicle-to-vehicle (V2V) communication by utilising DSRC proto-
cols; and 2) vehicle-to-infrastructure (V2I) communication by using mobile communi-
cation standards (e.g., 3G, LTE, or LTE-Advanced) to enable long distance communi-
cations. The main objectives of VANET include: 
1) Ensuring vehicular traffic safety and high efficiency of ITS [10]. 
2) Assisting drivers in critical situations such as accidents and traffic congestion [11]. 
3) Providing infotainment to vehicular users on roads such as information about 
traffic, weather conditions and entertainment such as video [12] [13]. 
4) Monitoring fleet of vehicles remotely. Thus, VANET can be useful in logistics and 
transportation applications [14] [15]. 
Figure 1 highlights the architecture of VANET. It illustrates the accident scenario on 
highway where collision information is forwarded to the neighbouring vehicles through 
both V2V and V2I modes of communication, thus avoiding huge traffic jam on the 
highway as the approaching vehicles can take different route towards their destination. 
VANET propagates critical and relevant information such as pre-crash, steep-curve 
ahead, or accident warnings. Ideally, this information must be shared with nodes (ve-
hicles &RSU) without any alteration to its content. VANET heavily relies on coopera-
tion and communication between nodes to ensure easy propagation of information. 
However, it is prone to various attacks (e.g., Denial of Service attacks, Man-in-the- 
Middle attacks, Message alteration attacks etc.) by malicious nodes and external mali-
cious interference on the network, potentially affecting its application behavior and ca-
pability to perform in a desired manner. In fact, VANET is a large-scale, decentralized 
and highly dynamic network which contains both legitimate and potentially malicious 
nodes. Therefore, it becomes extremely challenging to ensure confidentiality, integrity, 
availability, authenticity and non-repudiation in such highly mobile network. 
1.2. Motivation 
According to the World Economic Forum (2015) [16], global environmental, societal,  
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Figure 1. VANET Architecture; example of collision avoidance. 
 
geopolitical and technological threats (i.e., cyber attacks, data theft and technology 
misuse) are gaining more and more attention. Specifically, the risks caused due to cyber 
attacks will increase by 23.3% in 18 months and about 20.2% in the coming 10 years. 
Therefore, security becomes a crucial component in the design of new networking 
technologies. Especially in VANET, where vulnerabilities exploited in cyber attacks 
must be identified and addressed as quickly as possible (possibly in real-time) since an 
attack might have a severe impact on road users.  
VANET is an active research area and different studies were conducted on VANET 
security. Due to severity of impact, VANET security is becoming increasingly impor-
tant. Raya et al. were the first to study this topic. They highlighted several challenges 
and gaps in accomplishing VANET security, for instance, privacy preserving of vehicu-
lar user in a highly mobile network and message propagation in a secure vehicular en-
vironment [17]. To address these challenges, Fuentes et al. identified distinct security 
requirements for VANET in terms of authenticity, integrity, availability, confidentiality, 
and non-repudiation [18]. Moreover, considering the security requirements in VANET, 
several studies proposed a variety of attacker models such as [19] [20] [21]. These at-
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tacker models were classified into two distinct levels: high and low impact attackers. 
Similarly, various recent studies on VANET security identified different attacks based 
on the basic security requirements of confidentiality, integrity and availability [2] [22] 
[23] [24] [25]. Such classification is complex as a single attack might have several secu-
rity requirements at a particular time. This also results in the overlapping the attacks in 
different components of VANET, thus making the attack classification very compli-
cated. Bhargava et al. presented a study where a systematic approach is taken to analyse 
attacks focusing only on V2V communication in VANET [26]. The security of the 
in-vehicle communication was also the spotlight of other studies. For instance, Koshar 
et al. identified security gaps in Controller Area Network (CAN) of the vehicle by suc-
cessfully launching different attacks (malware integration and spoofing attacks) [27]. 
Similarly, Checkoway et al. described the proof-of-concept of an attack which com-
promised in-vehicle communication resulting in an access to internal components of a 
vehicle [28]. The main limitation of these research studies is the very focused study of a 
particular component of VANET, as the implementation of same attacks have different 
requirements and consequences in other components (e.g., RSU or Central Entity) of 
VANET. Moreover, solutions to cater these attacks are missing in these studies.    
Several recent research projects were entirely focused on VANET security and pri-
vacy. Table 1 summarizes research projects relevant in regards to the focus of this pa-
per. For instance, OVERSEE [29] and SeVeCOM [30] projects focused on the in-depth 
study of the security issues of the in-vehicular communication. Similarly, the main 
contribution of PRESERVE project was to design privacy-aware communication pro-
tocols for VANET [31]. 
The literature on VANET security either concentrates on particular VANET com-
ponents only (e.g., V2V communication or in-vehicle communication) or on specific 
security requirements (e.g., confidentiality, integrity and availability), missing others. 
Therefore, these approaches do not guarantee a holistic and comprehensive analysis of 
security in VANET. It might be the case that components, not deemed relevant at first, 
represent a source of vulnerabilities, and that requirements, like availability of mobile 
and static nodes, are neglected. This paper fills this gap and presents an asset-based ap-
proach to analyse security of VANET. 
In order to understand VANET security in depth, we followed a systematic approach 
which includes the following steps and are depicted in Figure 2. 
1) Identification of assets in VANET, 
2) Classification of assets, 
3) Identification of vulnerabilities on the assets, 
4) Identification of threats related to the assets, 
5) Identification of possible attacks based on the threats and identified vulnerabili-
ties, and 
6) Identification of feasible solutions to cater these VANET attacks. 
The remaining of the paper is organised as follows. Section 2 presents assets in 
VANET from a security point of view. Vulnerabilities and threats on the VANET assets  
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Table 1. Research projects on VANET security. 
Project Duration Objectives 
Open Vehicular Secure Platform 
Project (OVERSEE) [29] 01/2010-06/2012 
To design a standardized platform for 
secure vehicular communication 
Secure Vehicle Communication 
(SeVeCOM) [30] 01/2006-12/2008 
To provide solutions for V2V and V2I 
communication security 
Preparing Secure Vehicle-to-X 
Communication Systems  
(PRESERVE) [31] 
01/2011-16/2015 
To design and implement a testbed  
for secure and privacy-aware  
V2X communication 
E-safety vehicle intrusion protected 
applications (EVITA) [33] 07/2008-12/2011 
To design a secure and trustworthy 
architecture for intra-vehicular  
communication for on-board devices 
Satellite Applications for Emergency 
hamdling, traffic alerts, road safety and 
incident preventation (SafeTrip) [34] 
10/2009-03/2013 To develop a platform, allowing third parties to integrate security applications 
Privacy Enabled Capability In 
co-operative systems and safety 
applications (PRECOISA) [35] 
03/2008-08/2010 To develop a privacy-aware application for ITS systems 
Network on Wheels (NoW) [36] 05/2004-05/2008 To provide data security in V2V  communications 
Communication for eSafety 
(COMeSafety2) [37] 01/2010-10/2014 To develop standards for ITS security 
Cooperative cars and roads for safer 
and Intelligent Transportation System 
(CopITS) [38] 
10/2010-10/2013 
To develop communication protocol 
for efficient data transfer in V2V and 
V2I scenarios in Doha City 
Preventive and Active Safety 
Application (PREVENT) [39] 02/2004-01/2008 
To design and implement safer early 
warning system on roads 
Communication Network Vehicle 
Road Global Extension (CONVERGE) 
[40] 
08/2012-10/2015 
To design V2X architecture to  
provide real-time information  
directly in a secure and  
privacy-preserving environment 
Advanced Safety and Driver Support 
for Essential Road Transport (ASSET 
ROAD) [41] 
07/2008-12/2011 
To develop an approach to  
provide security on roads and  
increase traffic efficiency 
Engineering security and performance 
aware vehicular applications for safer 
and smarter roads (SafeITS) [42] 
01/2015-01/2018 
To design a security framework  
to integrate vehicular  
applications in VANET 
 
 
Figure 2. Systematic approach for VANET security. 
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are presented in Section 3 and 4 respectively. Section 5 introduces various attacks in 
VANET based on the identified vulnerabilities and threats. Finally, Section 6 draws 
conclusion of the paper. 
2. Assets in VANET 
Assets are the valuable components of the network [32]. Failure or misuse of these as-
sets will cause damage to the entire network, thus affecting its users on a very large 
scale. A vulnerable asset is a threat to the whole network. The network can experience 
several attacks, if identified vulnerabilities are exploited by the attackers. Therefore, the 
process of identifying and securing the assets along with the access control of the users 
on the network is a crucial step in VANET security [18]. 
2.1. Identification of Assets in VANET 
From a security point of view, the following are considered as assets in VANET because 
they have values for stakeholders: 
1) VANET user 
2) Exchanged data 
3) Vehicles 
4) Roadside units (RSU) 
5) Network communication protocols 
6) Central entity 
7) Third parties 
2.1.1. VANET User 
As VANET is designed to provide safety and comfort to vehicular users, these users 
constitute the most important asset in VANET. Safety of users as well as the security of 
their identity is crucial. Moreover, user’s privacy is considered to be the first VANET 
users concerns and need to be guaranteed [43] [44]. If the user is compromised, via a 
social engineering attack for example, all his private information is compromised and 
his vehicle become a point of failure to the networking system. 
2.1.2. Vehicles 
Vehicles, on the other hand are also one of the vital assets in VANET and they play dif-
ferent important roles in the network: 1) they generate critical data (e.g. traffic related 
information), 2) they route data for other vehicles, 3) and they store critical data (e.g. 
user identity, warning messages to be forwarded). 
In VANET, every vehicle is composed of various components: 1) sensors, 2) Applica-
tion Unit (AU) and 3) On Board Unit (OBU). Sensors collect information from sur-
roundings and AU generate messages based on the gathered information. These mes-
sages are shared with neighboring vehicles via OBU. Compromising the vehicle, or any 
component in the vehicular system, will alter the generated messages as well as the 
routing operations, resulting in the propagation of compromised messages in the net-
work. Therefore, the availability and the access to the vehicle must be guaranteed. 
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2.1.3. Exchanged Data 
Important messages are transmitted and exchanged between different vehicles and 
nearby RSUs. As these messages can contain lifesaving information such as accident 
warning, or sensitive information like user private details (e.g. identity and location.), 
data security and privacy must be guaranteed in terms of confidentiality, integrity and 
availability (CIA). 
2.1.4. Road Side Unit (RSU) 
RSU acts as a bridge between the vehicles and the infrastructure during V2I communi-
cation. In RSU, the important components are its hardware, operating system (OS) and 
software residing on OS. This software communicates with vehicles on one hand and 
with infrastructure on the other. RSU, being static in nature, is more vulnerable to at-
tacks and is one of the preferred passage for attackers to gain entry to VANET. If the 
RSU is compromised, the data stored in the RSU is compromised, and the communica-
tion with the infrastructure is not guaranteed. 
2.1.5. Central Entity 
The central entity is another static node in the VANET architecture which includes the 
application servers providing various applications such as collision avoidance applica-
tion, weather and traffic updates etc. It is located in the infrastructure domain, and 
plays a vital role during V2I communication where all the messages are first received by 
the application server. It authenticates the received message and forwards it to other 
vehicles over a large geographical location. When the central entity is compromised (a 
compromised server or OS), all the V2I operations as well as the running services are 
affected, and the VANET operations are limited. Therefore, the access and the availa-
bility of the central entity are key requirements in VANET. 
2.1.6. Third Parties 
Third parties represents various authorities which resides in the infrastructure domain 
in VANET such as vehicle manufacturers and traffic police. These authorities have 
their own cryptographic tools which are integrated to the OBU of the vehicles. It should 
be made sure that these parties are free from bugs and malwares; they must be trusted 
and are referred to as trusted third parties (TTP). 
2.1.7. Network Communication Protocols 
After presenting the different nodes of VANET and their role in building the VANET 
security, we need to ensure a secured communication between them. This includes the 
following types of communications: 
• In-vehicle communication between sensors, AU and OBU via Controller Area Net-
work (CAN), 
• Communication between two vehicles (V2V), and 
• Communication between vehicle and adjacent RSU (V2I). 
An insecure communication protocol will not guarantee the safe transmission of data 
between vehicular nodes in the network. 
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2.2. Classification of Assets 
Asset classification is the key to various security measures that need to be implemented 
for asset optimization. In most security assessments reports, assets are divided in four 
categories: 1) Information, 2) Software, 3) Physical, and 4) Services [45]. In our point of 
view, this classification doesn't reflect the VANET operations and security require-
ments. For example, the vehicle and the central entity are both physical assets, but they 
use different communication protocols (vehicle is a mobile node using wireless com-
munication protocols, and the central entity is static and part of the wired network), 
and they require different security implementations (the security of the wireless ad-hoc 
network is different compared to the wired network).  
In this report, we have classified the assets into three broad classes according to their 
role, mobility and impact on the VANET. The purpose of this classification is to facili-
tate the security assessment and the threat analysis. Since, in VANET, the assets are 
distributed in different domains, therefore, we classify these assets into three classes as 
depicted in Figure 3. These are: 
• Vehicular System: This class includes the vehicular user, vehicles and communica-
tion network. 
• Information: This class contains the information carrying important messages. 
• Infrastructure: This class includes the static entities along VANET, such as RSU, 
central entity and third parties. 
In the following section, we will identify vulnerabilities in these classes of assets. 
3. Vulnerabilities in VANET 
Vulnerability is the weakness in the system which is exploited by the malicious users in 
the form of attacks for their own benefits. In this section, we identified vulnerabilities in 
VANET which are presented according to asset classification. The taxonomy of the 
vulnerabilities in depicted in Figure 4. 
 
 
Figure 3. Assets in vehicular networks. 
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Figure 4. Taxonomy of vulnerabilities in VANET. 
3.1. Vulnerabilities in Vehicular System 
The vulnerabilities in this cluster include the physical access of an unauthorized person 
to the vehicle itself which poses direct risk on the vehicle’s sensing and communication 
capabilities. Similarly, the use of insecure algorithms (weak passwords) to exchange 
significant information such as user information and credentials via wireless commu-
nication poses risk on the user’s privacy. Moreover, software flaws such as buffer over-
flow, insecure cryptographic algorithms and key management failure offer vulnerabili-
ties in the vehicular system which can be exploited by the attacker to launch several at-
tacks. For instance, researchers from Tencent Keen Security Lab successfully imple-
mented various attacks remotely on Tesla cars by accessing the CAN of vehicles [46]. 
3.2. Vulnerabilities in Information 
Sensitive messages such as vehicular user personal information must be secured. If data 
is not encrypted and not signed, then the data is vulnerable to attacks by attacker where 
the attacker can modify the messages with bogus information. Similarly, no integrity 
checks on the data and routing messages offer vulnerabilities to be exploited by 
launching several attacks such as impersonation attacks, sybil attacks etc. Moreover, the 
manipulation of routing table with wrong routing information will result in the 
non-availability or alteration of these messages. As messages are of foremost impor-
tance in VANET, the non-availability or alteration of these messages can leave severe 
impact on the network. 
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3.3. Vulnerabilities in Infrastructure 
Infrastructure as the static entity offers various vulnerabilities such as software and op-
erating systems vulnerabilities. The back-end channel between RSU and central entity 
must be secured and encrypted. Any information sent on the un-encrypted communi-
cation channel is a vulnerability and can be interpreted and modified by the attacker. 
The attacker can also take advantage of the hardware malfunctions at RSU and central 
entity. e.g., an attacker can deceive a speed camera after stealing vehicular user infor-
mation. 
4. Threats in Vehicular System 
This section introduces various potential threats according to VANET cluster. The 
taxonomy of threats in these VANET cluster is depicted in Figure 5. 
4.1. Threats to Vehicular System 
This category include threats to the vehicle, vehicular user and communication network 
i.e., 
4.1.1. Vehicle 
Usually, VANET involve high speed mobility of vehicles and two vehicles communicate 
with each other for a very short span of time. However, there are still some threats to  
 
 
Figure 5. Taxonomy of threats in VANET. 
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vehicles and its different components. The attacker can plan to access the OBU or AU 
of vehicle and sensors. The threat also involves the attacker being able to install mal-
ware on AU and sensors. Firmware updates are also one of the targets where the at-
tacker injects malicious code inside the in-vehicle network via CAN. This can lead to 
drastic results e.g., the attacker can misconfigure the sensor with its malicious code [47] 
[48]. 
4.1.2. User Privacy 
Privacy is one of the important security aspects which aims to ensure that the identity 
of vehicular user is private and secure from unapproved person [49]. The threat in-
cludes revealing the vehicular user identity and its geographical location and sensitive 
information. 
4.1.3. Communication Network 
Wireless communication network is used for the transportation of messages in 
VANET. As this wireless medium is exposed to different vulnerabilities, it offer several 
opportunities which are exploitable by an attacker. For the in-vehicle network, the 
threats include the misconfiguration of OBU and sensors by an attacker via CAN. For 
V2V and V2I, it includes threats to different attacks such as Denial of Service (DoS), 
Man-in-the-Middle (MITM) attacks, altering the messages en-route and jamming the 
communication channel etc.   
4.2. Threats to Information 
Information contains important messages about a particular event, which is usually 
exchanged among the vehicles and RSUs during V2V and V2I communication. Threats 
to information always exist where the main interest of the attacker is to compromise its 
confidentiality, integrity and authenticity (CIA). The threats to information can be ex-
ploited in following different security aspects [50].  
4.2.1. Threats to Confidentiality of Information 
Information contains important messages about a particular event, which is usually 
exchanged among the vehicles and RSUs during V2V and V2I communication. Threats 
to information always exist where the main interest of the attacker is to compromise its 
confidentiality, integrity and authenticity (CIA). The threats to information can be ex-
ploited in following different security aspects [51].  
4.2.2. Threats to Authenticity of Information 
The routing of accurate and authentic information should be ensured in VANET as it 
involves several critical and lifesaving contexts. The source and destination in VANET 
must be known and verifiable. The threat lies to information from this perspective is 
the identity theft of vehicular user from an attacker. This can lead to severe and drastic 
results in VANET, especially during the event of an accident. 
4.2.3. Threats to Integrity of Information 
Information transmitted from source should arrive to destination without any altera-
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tion to its content. The threat from this aspect is that the information can be tempered, 
modified or deleted from attacker in transit while carrying the transmission of infor-
mation between two vehicles [52]. Therefore, integrity of information in both modes of 
communication (V2V and V2I) should be ensured. 
4.2.4. Threats to Availability of Information 
Since the main aim of VANET is to provide drivers’ safety, it should be ensured that the 
information transmitted from any vehicle regarding particular context is available to 
neighboring vehicles and adjacent RSU. 
4.2.5. Non-Repudiation 
Non-repudiation ensures the information generated from sender and receiver is verifi-
able by the authorities. Therefore, the senders should be responsible for the messages 
generated. The threat from this category is the denial of message produced by sender or 
denial of message reception by receiver.    
4.3. Threats to Infrastructure 
Infrastructure refers to the static units present along the road in form of RSU. The 
probability of threats to infrastructure is high due to its non-mobile nature. The threats 
include damage to its hardware and access to RSU software. 
4.3.1. Road Side Unit (RSU) 
Usually network operators ensure high level of security in RSU but as RSU is mostly 
static in VANET, the major threat to RSU include physical damages to its hardware. 
Therefore, the physical security is mostly achieved via CCTVs. The other threats in-
clude illegal access of attacker to its software platform, DoS attack and rouge RSU. 
Rouge RSU must be identified intelligently and eliminated from the network. 
4.3.2. Central Entity 
Central entity is present in the infrastructure domain for transporting V2I messages 
over a long geographical area. The messages are first received at central entity, there-
fore, the threat exists to information itself where the attacker can modify its content. 
Other threats include DoS, MITM attacks and introduction of virus and Trojans to the 
OS of the central entity. 
5. Attacks in VANET 
5.1. Attacks 
An attack is a sequence of calculated steps which are used to gain unauthorized entry to 
a system for an attacker’s own interest. Attack is not a sudden process but is the result 
of continuous and repeated planning. The attacker needs prior knowledge of the system 
before planning and launching any attack. Attack steps are: 
1) Monitoring the overall system 
2) Collecting necessary information of the system 
3) Preparing a plan for attack 
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4) Analyzing the attack methodology 
5) Executing the attack against target system, and 
6) Clear the attack tracks 
Attackers are always in advantage as they have to find only a single vulnerability in 
the network. On the other hand, defenders have to think a step ahead of attackers to 
secure the whole network, i.e., they have ideally to address all vulnerabilities. 
5.2. Factors for Carrying Out an Attack in VANET 
Pursuing and carrying-out an attack in VANET depends on various factors such as: 
5.2.1. Attacker Motivation 
Motivation of an attacker is one of the significant factor for carrying out an attack in 
VANET. The motivation of attacker is usually categorized into high, medium and low 
[53]. The higher the level of motivation of an attacker, the higher is the risk to VANET. 
The attacker can aim for any specific vulnerability he discovered in VANET and can 
have a major impact on the network. For example, OBU is one of the important entity 
of vehicle and is of great interest to every attacker. Any vulnerability in it will expose 
the VANET to high risk. 
5.2.2. Target of Attack 
Attack on VANET cannot be launched unless the attacker discovered any vulnerability 
in the network. The attacker can target any asset, for instance, misconfiguration of the 
hardware components like OBU, vehicle sensors and communication protocols which 
enable the sender and receiver to exchange important messages. 
5.2.3. Budget for an Attack 
Budget is another important factor to carry out an attack. Attackers need some re-
sources to launch an attack against any specific component of the network such as 
hardware and software [54] [55]. Without any suitable resources, carrying an attack 
becomes very difficult, e.g., to block the communication channel, an attacker needs a 
signal jammer which can disturb the transportation of messages across the network. It 
should be noted that high budget for an attack can increase the motivation level of the 
attacker and therefore, the attacker can aim to launch more sophisticated attacks on 
VANET. 
5.2.4. Time for an Attack 
Time represents the total time taken by an attacker to launch an attack. This factor in-
cludes the time consumed for all attack steps such as time from gathering information 
until the successful execution of attack on the network [56]. Gathering information it-
self is a challenging and time consuming task, and in case of VANET, it is very crucial 
since the two vehicles meet for very small interval of time. Therefore, the attacker has to 
first gather information and then find a vulnerability in that short span of time. 
5.2.5. Personal Reputation 
The attacker can carry and pursue an attack with the intention of getting some fame 
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and reputation as a hacker [57]. This factor is also linked with the motivation of an at-
tacker. To gain high reputation, the attacker can launch an attack with high level of so-
phistication. 
5.3. Attack Steps in VANET 
VANET is an important network which involves transportation of important and life-
saving messages such as pre-crash warning. However, VANET is exposed to different 
vulnerabilities and types of attack. The attack steps in case of VANET are shown in 
Figure 6. These steps are as follows: 
1) The attacker monitors the VANET network including every asset i.e., available ve-
hicles in the network, target wireless network and available infrastructure. 
2) Attacker collects all the possible information of every available entity in VANET. 
For instance, the attacker tries to get information regarding the OBU of vehicle or V2V 
and V2I communication protocols. The main motivation of this step is to find known 
vulnerabilities in the network which can be targeted by an attacker. 
3) Attacker plans the strategy of an attack in VANET, i.e., how and which asset of 
VANET will be an easy target for him. This planning can be against: 
a) Vehicular System: One component which attacker can aim is the wireless network 
of the vehicular system. Since important messages are carried through wireless medium 
such as DSRC and IEEE 802.11 technology, the wireless network is exposed to different 
vulnerabilities, providing many opportunities to the attacker to plan an attack against 
it. Other targets in vehicular system includes different components of vehicle such as 
OBU and sensors. 
b) Information: One of the targets of an attacker is the information in transit from 
one vehicle to its neighbor vehicles and RSUs. 
c) Infrastructure: The lowest priority of these attacks will be the adjacent infrastruc-
ture, i.e., RSU and mobile communication base stations like Relay Nodes and LTE base 
station. Usually, the network operators ensure high level of security, therefore, gaining 
access to these infrastructure usually requires high level motivation and high engage-
ment of attackers. 
 
 
Figure 6. Attack steps in VANET. 
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4) Attacker analyses the strategy and the methodology of carrying an attack on 
VANET. 
5) The attacker executes its plan by targeting the vulnerability discovered in the net-
work 
6) After execution of an attack, the main focus of the attacker is to clear his attack 
tracks, so that no one can blame him out for that specific attack such as different an-
ti-forensic techniques to deceive law enforcement agencies [48]. 
5.4. Attacks in VANET 
This section is dedicated for the attacks categorized according to VANET assets. The 
detailed taxonomy of attacks in VANET is depicted in Figure 7. 
5.4.1. Attacks on Vehicular System 
Vehicular system constitutes an important asset in VANET. The attacks specific to ve-
hicular system are: 
1) Social Ethical Attacks  
This attack deals with the moral ethics of vehicular users. The main aim of this attack 
is to play with the emotions of the user by transmitting non-moral and inappropriate 
messages [20]. 
2) Cheating Sensor Information Attack  
These attacks focuses on hacking the OBU and AU of a vehicle. This results in the 
modification of the sensor information such that it can cheat the authorities by chang-
ing its different parameters like location and speed [49].   
 
 
Figure 7. Taxonomy of attacks in VANET. 
F. Ahmad et al. 
 
53 
3) Jamming Attacks at Vehicle Level 
The main focus of these attacks is to prevent communication between the internal 
components of vehicles by jamming its communication network. These attacks include 
Denial of Service (DoS) and Distributed DoS (DDoS) attacks [58]. 
4) Bogus Information Attack 
In this attack, the attacker tries to affect the network by transmitting false and wrong 
information to other vehicles. For instance, the attacker can free the road for himself by 
creating congestion to neighboring vehicles by transmitting false information. 
5) Sensor Impersonation Attack 
In VANET, the vehicle is equipped with various sensors ranging from speed sensor 
to positioning sensor. Every vehicle is assigned a unique identity in the network. In this 
attack, the attacker impersonates the legitimate vehicle sensors to perform the desired 
operation for attackers benefits and then changes its identity [59]. For instance, if an 
attacker is involved in some accident, then he changes his identity and can deceive the 
law enforcement authorities. This attack is possible due to the hardware vulnerabilities 
of the OBU where the attacker can access the desired sensor and impersonates it and 
disable the functionality of particular sensor. 
6) Physical Damage to Vehicular Components  
Physical damage (e.g. vandalism) by an attacker can compromise the security of ve-
hicle and its assets; thus resulting in the propagation of tempered messages in the net-
work. 
7) Malware Integration to Vehicles Remotely  
In this particular cyberattack, the attacker introduces malware (virus, spam, and 
Trojans) to the vehicular system using one of the following assets: a) In-Vehicle com-
munication network: The attacker adds malware to the information propagated be-
tween internal components of the vehicles, and b) Wireless Communication: where 
malware is integrated at the OBU of the vehicle by an attacker, thus resulting in the ex-
change of compromised messages between neighboring vehicles. 
8) Network Monitoring Attack  
In this attack, the attacker monitors the whole network and listens to the communi-
cation between vehicles and can pass this sensitive information to beneficiaries. For in-
stance, an attacker can change the information of patient sent by an ambulance. 
5.4.2. Attacks on Information 
As mentioned earlier, information is the most important asset in VANET due to its 
critical and lifesaving messages. The attacks on the information can be categorized into 
following: 
1) Eavesdropping of Sensitive Data  
The attacker behaves passively in this attack, where the main focus of the attacker is 
to illegally listen to the communication in the network [60]. For instance, the commu-
nication between law enforcement authorities while chasing the criminals. The attacker 
can also compromise the privacy of the vehicular users where the attacker can reveal 
the private and useful credentials of the user such as user identity and location. 
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2) Jamming Attack  
Jamming attacks are one of the severe attacks in VANET [61] [62] [63] where the 
communication channel is blocked by the attacker which stops the propagation of crit-
ical messages in the network. For example, the information of traffic jam on the high-
way to the following vehicles due to unavailability of communication channel can result 
in massive congestion on the road. Jamming attacks can be launched at following ve-
nues in the communication network: a) Wireless Communication: Jams the communi-
cation channel between two vehicles and neighboring RSU, and b) Wired Communica-
tion: Jams the communication between RSU and central entity. 
3) Impersonation Attacks  
In VANET, every vehicles and RSUs are assigned with a unique identity which can 
locate them in the network during accidents [64]. In this type of attack, the attacker 
changes his identity for his own benefits. For instance, if an attacker is involved in par-
ticular accident at certain location, then the attacker changes his identity, so that hecan 
deceive the law enforcement authorities. The attacker exploits the insecure wireless 
communication to impersonate the particular vehicle and alters the messages which are 
en-route to other vehicles. 
4) Man-in-the-Middle (MITM) Attacks  
MITM attacks represents an intermediate adversary node which can intercept and 
modify the messages en-route from RSU to vehicles and vice versa. These attacks can 
result in the violation of the integrity and confidentiality of the messages [65]. The at-
tackers mostly exploit the non-encrypted nature of messages on the insecure wireless 
communication channel to launch these attacks. The main intentions of this adversary 
node is to capture the message, alter it and forward the bogus message or updated mes-
sage with wrong information to other vehicles. 
5) Spoofing Attacks  
In this particular attack, the attacker steals the identity of a legitimate vehicle to be-
come part of the network by transmitting wrong location information. 
5.4.3. Attacks on Infrastructure 
Infrastructure, being the static entity in VANET, is one of the favorite location for an 
attacker to launch different network attacks DoS and MITM attacks, message alteration 
on back-end channel and impersonation attacks.  
1) Network Attacks  
The attacker exploits the insecure wireless communication channel to launch illegal 
monitoring of the network containing significant messages such as traffic accident. The 
attacker can launch following attacks in the network, 
a) DoS attacks: leaving a severe impact on the network by preventing vehicles to re-
ceive sensitive information such as road accident warnings. Two techniques are used to 
perform DoS attacks in VANET [66] [67]. 1) Transmission of random signal in a given 
frequency range of message communication, and 2) generation of messages in huge 
quantity at the physical layer of VANET to take down the communication channel. 
b) Sybil attacks: which involves the generation of multiple identities by a malicious  
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Table 2. Attack mapping in VANET and their solutions. 
Asset Vulnerability Threat Attack Solution Violated Security Requirement 
Vehicle/ 
Vehicular User 
Software flaw (Weak 
message propagation 
algorithm) 
Privacy leakage of  
sensitive information 
Malware  
integration 
Updating antivirus,  
Sandbox approach [70] Availability/Authentication 
Vehicle OBU vulnerability 
Unauthorised  
manipulation  
of routing table 
Jamming attacks  
at vehicle level 
Frequency hopping,  
Multiple radio transceivers Availability 
Vehicle Vehicular hardware flaws 
Disclosure of  
sensitive information 
Sensor  
impersonation SPECS [71] Authentication 
Vehicle OBU vulnerabilities, Sensors malfunctions 
Network flooding with 
wrong information 
Bogus  
information ECDSA [72] Authentication/Integrity 
Vehicle Insecure cryptographic algorithms 
Illegal software  
updates 
Remote  
firmware updates 
Secure firmware updates  
over the air (FOTA) [73] Authentication 
Vehicle/ 
Vehicular User 
Software flaws, Weak 
Password 
Privacy leakage  
of sensitive data 
Social  
engineering attack 
Encrypted and strong password 
for message communication Integrity/Privacy 
Vehicle Ohysical access to vehicles 
Damaging sensors to 
perform correctly 
Physical  
damage to vehicles Access control Authentication 
Vehicular User 
OBU vulnerabilities, 
Inseucre wireless 
communication 
Revelation of users 
identity 
User privacy  
disclosure 
Holistic approach for data 
transmission [74] Privacy/Authentication 
Information 
Broadcast nature of 
messages via wireless 
communication channel 
Revelation of sensitive 
information and user’s 
private credentials 
Eavesdropping Strong encrypted message  for user’s communication Privacy/Authentication 
Information 
OBU vulnerabilities, 
Insecure wireless 
communication  
channel 
Prevents vehicles to 
receive sensitive  
information and use 
network services 
Jamming attacks 
Assign IPs to vehicles and drop 
duplicate IP during message 
transfer [58], Change packet 
delivery ratio (PDR) based on 
PDR rate decrease [75], 
DJAVAN [76] 
Availability 
Information Insecure wireless communication channel Messages alterations 
Impersonation 
attacks 
Identity-based batch  
verification scheme [77] Authentication 
Information 
Non-encrypted 
messages, Insecure 
wireless communication 
channel 
Message modification 
with wrong and  
compromised messages 
MITM attacks Strong cryptographic  techniques Availability/Confidentiality 
Information Vulnerable wireless communication channel 
Message manipulation 
and dropping Spoofing attacks 
Multi-antenna system with 
known movements [78], Secure 
in-region verification [79] 
Authentication 
RSU, Wired 
communication, 
Central entity 
Flaws in routing table 
and non-encrypted 
messages 
Data leakage on 
back-end wired  
channel 
Sybil attacks 
Position verification of  
neighbouring nodes [80], 
VANET PKI [17], RobSAD [81] 
Authentication/Availability 
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Continued 
Wired 
communication 
channel 
Un-encrypted back-end 
communication channel 
Revelation of sensitive 
information 
Eavesdropping 
between RSU and 
central entity 
Use of encrypted messages Confidentiality/Privacy 
RSU, Central 
entity 
Hardware  
vulnerabilities 
Network flooding with 
compromised messages 
Bogus information 
between RSU and 
central entity 
ECDSA Confidentiality/Authentication 
Wired 
communication 
channel 
Hardware malfunction, 
Software 
flaws,Un-encrypted 
communication channel 
Message alterations 
en-route to other  
vehicles via RSU  
and central entity 
MITM attacks  
between RSU and 
cental entity 
Strong cryptographic  
techniques Confidentiality/Availability 
Wired 
communication 
channel 
Un-encrypted back-end 
communication channel Discarding messages Wormhole attacks 
Packet leash [82] [83], 
HEAP [84] Confidentiality/Authentication 
 
attacker [68]. Sybil attacks hinders the normal VANET operation as mobility of these 
vehicles reduces the network efficiency by increasing the difficulty of attackers identifi-
cation. 
c) Worm hole attacks: involving the tunnelling of packets between two nodes located 
at remote locations [69], and 
d) MITM attacks: by creating a rogue entity between RSU and central entity.  
2) Message Alteration at Back-end Channel  
As infrastructure is responsible to disseminate verified information via RSU and 
central entity. Any attack on this information can leave a severe impact on the overall 
network. For instance, if the attacker can intercept and modify the message between 
RSU and central entity, then the whole network will be flooded with altered message, 
resulting in huge impact on the overall network. 
Table 2 summarizes possible attacks in VANET based on assets, vulnerabilities and 
threats reviewed in section 2, 3 and 4 respectively. Moreover, the table also provides 
reasonable solutions to these identified attacks.   
6. Conclusions 
VANET is an important and promising technology which aims to increase safety on the 
roads by enabling vehicles to communicate with each other. However, this communica-
tion between vehicles via insecure communication channel exposes VANET to various 
threats and attacks. This paper reviews these attacks from cyber security aspects where 
a systematic methodology is proposed and adopted to identify attacks on VANET.  
It can be concluded that attackers can exploit the threats reviewed in section 4 for 
their own benefits by identifying different vulnerabilities in infrastructure, information 
and vehicular systems to launch several attacks. However, the window of opportunity 
for an attacker to launch attacks on the information and vehicular system is very small. 
This is due to the fact that vehicles are highly mobile and diverse, providing a limited 
time for vehicles to interact via V2V communication. On the other hand, infrastructure 
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are exposed to various threats due to their static nature, thus resulting in high probabil-
ity of attack occurrence. Although, network operators ensure high security in RSU, the 
potential for attacks are still significant enough, given a highly motivated attacker. 
These attacks can have a severe impact on VANET. Therefore, for secure transmission 
of information, access to the network for an attacker should be restricted. Moreover, a 
strong security framework for message routing is required for VANET due to the sensi-
tive nature involved, such as collision avoidance messages. 
This study provides a basic platform for identifying various parameters in the design 
of security frameworks (e.g., intrusion detection) in VANET. In our future work, we 
will design a security framework at the asset level in VANET to ensure secure routing 
of messages in an attack-free environment. 
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